



Constructing a New Imperialism: Israel and the West Bank

Author(s): Sheila Ryan

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *MERIP Reports*, No. 9 (May - Jun., 1972), pp. 3-11+17

Published by: [Middle East Research and Information Project \(MERIP\)](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012383>

Accessed: 26/01/2013 01:51

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *MERIP Reports*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Constructing a new Imperialism:

Israel and the West Bank

by Sheila Ryan

After the June 1967 war more than tripled the territory under Israeli control, argument broke out in the Israeli ruling class on how to deal with the newly occupied areas.


To some, like Cabinet Minister Pinhas Sapir, the captured territory was a Trojan horse, containing a million Arabs bound to adulterate the Jewishness of the state of Israel and its culture. If Israel tried to swallow the new territory, it would choke. On the other hand, by withdrawing from the heavily populated Arab areas, Israel would be surrendering nothing, but rather "freeing herself of a burden" according to this "Little Israel" tendency.¹

This position is quite consistent with the peculiar kind of settler colonialism on which the state of Israel was based. Unlike the French colons in Algeria and the British settlers in Rhodesia, who appropriated vast tracts of land and relied upon underpaid native labor to make their agriculture profitable, the Zionists subsidized their agricultural production on land alienated from the Palestinian peasantry by large contributions from Zionists abroad, employed Jewish agricultural labor and expelled most of the Palestinians in 1948. The "Little Israel" group harkens back to the days of the "Jewish labor" campaigns, during the British Mandate, when Arab labor was boycotted in order to construct (and protect the privileged position of) a Jewish working class.

This unique kind of colonialism was unfortunately quite effective in enabling the settlers to sink deep roots and solidly entrench themselves in Palestine. Since the establishment of Israel, the Zionists have relied on American and other Western military assistance to maintain Israel as an almost exclusively Jewish state.

The Israeli victory in 1967, however, may have signalled the end of the dominance of this brand of Zionism, and set the stage for a new sort -- the imperialism which Abba Eban envisioned when he once said that Israel wanted the same type of relationship with the surrounding Arab countries as the U.S. had with Latin America.²

Since its inception, Israel has been sealed off from commerce with adjacent states by the Arab boycott, a severe limitation on the Israeli economy. "The most natural markets for Israel would be the Arab countries," observes a recent RAND study,³ but instead Israel has been forced to trade primarily with the industrialized world: 70 percent of its exports are to Western Europe and North America.³ There are considerable obstacles to the continued growth of Israeli exports to the advanced capitalist countries. Citrus, which in 1950 comprised half of Israeli merchandise exports is today only about 15 percent, and given the problems of competition in European markets and depletion of fertile land and water resources, only a very small rate of long range growth can be projected for citrus exports.⁴ Polished diamonds, a major Israeli export (over a sixth of total Israeli exports in 1968, worth \$194 million) "has now become a dominant factor on the world market and in the future its rate of growth is expected to diminish too."⁵ Israeli paper, plywood, cement, tires and cotton yarn exports -- Israel's most important manufacturing exports -- have grown very little in the last few years, because "in all these cases competition on the world market has been very fierce, partly with other developing countries... The most important factor in their past growth was the fact that they were promoted by artificial means such as bilateral trade agreements, very high effective exchange rates...and protective market sharing agreements on the domestic market. With time this protection was mitigated..."⁶



Exports are particularly crucial to the Israeli economy because it is so heavily dependent on imports, particularly for military purposes. Israel has a massive balance of payments deficit -- about a billion dollars annually.

Like any other capitalist economy, the Israeli economy is driven by the profit motive. Moreover, a high standard of living for its Western Jewish population is strategically necessary for the Israeli state, because Western immigrants (and now particularly Russian immigrants) can be attracted to and induced to remain in Israel only if they can be offered a standard of living artificially high for the Middle East.

Israel is no longer being flooded with unskilled immigrants from North Africa and Asia, and thus needs to look elsewhere for people to do the work which the privileged strata in Israel scorns. This, as well as a quest for markets, provides an impetus to integrate the economies of the newly occupied territory into that of Israel. When Prime Minister Golda Meir hesitated on the question of permitting the employment of

West Bankers in Israel, an angry Israeli wrote to the daily newspaper Haaretz, "If Mrs. Meir wants to see Hebrew workers sweating away on hot summer days, if it gives her pleasure, this is her own business. But it cannot become the national criterion on which to convince the public that we should not integrate the economy of the West Bank..."

"Every Jewish mother wants her son to finish high school and university, and to become a chemist, technician engineer or at least a trained plumber. Who is training the young people today for the simple tasks, carrying buckets of cement or asphalt for road making? In the course of time we shall in any case need Arab workers for building, agriculture and even industry. Immigrants are more and more people whose professions are far from these simple tasks."⁷

These two economic forces -- the desire for nearby, profitable markets and cheap labor -- underlay the policy of Moshe Dayan for the occupied territories. "The only possible solution Israel would accept," the New York Times quoted Dayan as saying, "would be one based on a peaceful relation-

ship, with trade between Israel and her Arab neighbors." In this sphere, he added, economic cooperation between Israel and the occupied areas should be intensified if the areas were to be operated profitably.⁸

Effects of Occupation

Moshe Dayan's guidelines for the government of the West Bank are economic integration with Israel, coupled with maintenance of economic access to the East Bank (Jordan), administration through traditional leadership and postponement of the decision on the future political status of the West Bank.⁹

In less than five years of occupation, the economy of the West Bank has been drastically re-oriented, away from the East Bank and towards Israel. Before the war, of course, the West Bank, like the rest of the Arab world, bought nothing from Israel, but Israel's share of the imports of the occupied territories was 76% in 1968, 80% in 1969, and grew to 86% in 1970.¹⁰

In its report, Three Years of Military Government, the Israeli Ministry of Defense states that, "As a matter of fact, the Six Day War erased the 'Green line' that used to separate Israel from the areas now administered and it is quite unavoidable and natural that these areas now depend on Israel in all economic matters and services."¹¹ But it would seem that Israeli stinginess with the licenses they require for import across the Jordan river, rather than natural tendencies, was responsible for the decline in the East Bank's share of exports to the occupied areas, from a mere 8% in 1968 and 1969 to 4% in 1970.¹² The smallness of the fractions are still more striking when one considers that before the June war all imports into the West Bank came across the bridges over the Jordan river -- foreign goods, as well as industrial goods and a great deal of grain and livestock from the East Bank itself.

Between 1948 and 1967, the market for the West Bank's agricultural and industrial surplus lay across the river. In the second part of 1968, after the war, 79% of the occupied areas' exports still went to the East Bank, but since then the decline has

been precipitous: from 47% in 1968 to 41% in 1970.¹³ Meanwhile Israel's portion of the West Bank's exports has risen from nothing before the war to 40% in 1970.¹⁴

The Israeli Ministry of Defense, in its report on Development and Economic Situation in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and North Sinai puts it succinctly: "The areas are a supplementary market for Israeli goods and services on the one hand, and a source of factors of production, especially unskilled labor, for the Israeli economy on the other."¹⁵

The occupied areas are a market of growing importance for the Israeli economy: in 1969, exports of goods to the occupied areas accounted for 9% of all such Israeli exports. This figure represented a 12% increase over the figure of the previous year.¹⁶

At the same time as Israel is increasing its markets in the occupied territories, it is constantly extracting more "factors of production," and Israeli policy in the occupation of the West Bank is aimed at restructuring the economy to enable still more "factors of production" to be taken from it in the future. As a result, pattern of West Bank, employment, agriculture and industry are increasingly taking on the configurations of an Israeli colony.


Employment

The most significant of Israeli policies for economic colonization of the West Bank is the employment of West Bank workers in low-paid unskilled labor in Israel. By June 1971, one-fifth of the West Bank labor force was employed by Israel (apart from West Bank industrial workers indirectly employed by Israel in filling orders placed with local industry).¹⁷ See Table 1.

The decision of the Israeli government to permit the employment of workers from the West Bank and other parts of the occupied areas in Israel can be traced to the occurrence of a labor shortage which was threatening the potential of the Israeli economy for expansion. In July, 1967, The Israeli Economic Planning Authority opposed the employment of workers from the occupied

TABLE 1

EMPLOYMENT OF WEST BANK WORKERS IN ISRAEL



Source: Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories, Israel Ministry of Defense, Three Years of Military Government June, 1970 p. 16.

areas because it feared that the problem of unemployment among Israelis would be intensified.¹⁸ A year later, Moshe Dayan revived the plan, and it was approved, because by then there was a labor shortage and the Israeli economy needed more workers. Even then the Labor Ministry insisted on "the express stipulation that Israeli citizens (would not) be affected."¹⁹

In fact, the West Bank and other occupied areas did provide the Israeli economy with the workers it needed for the post-war expansion. A Ministry of Defense document states, "... the areas are a reservoir of manpower for the Israeli economy: the increment of workers from the areas in 1969 was about one-fifth of that in the total number of persons employed in Israel from all sources.

"In 1969 the number of Israelis -- Jews and non-Jews -- employed in agriculture dropped by about 2.5% and the gap was filled by workers from the areas: in industry, the number of workers rose by about 6% and more than a quarter of the increment came from the areas. In the building trade, the labour accretion from the areas accounted for more than half the total rise in the number of persons employed, with the concomitant of a serious process of withdrawal of Jewish workers from the trade."²⁰ (emphasis supplied)

By 1970 60% of the workers from the occupied territories working in Israel were employed in construction, where they were "most essential."²¹ Here they contributed to the fulfillment not only of short-range

Israeli economic aims, but also of Israeli long-term political strategy. Thousands of Arab workers from the occupied areas were employed in throwing up a ring of Israeli apartment blocks around the Arab sector of Jerusalem, cutting the Arab city off from the West Bank -- a strategic asset for Israel in event of war. The apartments are planned to house new Jewish immigrants, and are an integral part of the Israeli plan to turn Jerusalem into a Jewish city. (See the following articles)

The Palestinian Arab workers from the occupied areas are becoming a heavily exploited, low-paid, unskilled or semi-skilled sector of the working class in Israel, concentrated in menial work in construction and agriculture. (See Table 2.) The Israeli government has taken an active hand both in bringing workers from the West Bank into the Israeli labor force, and in channelling them into that strata of the working class.

Shortly after the Israeli government decided to permit employment of workers from the occupied areas in Israel, the occupation authorities opened employment offices on the West Bank and in the other oc-

cupied areas. Now at least 17 such offices are operating on the West Bank.²² The function of these offices is to recruit West Bankers for employment in Israel; only 9% of the workers who applied at these offices in early 1970, for example, were placed in jobs on the West Bank.²³ (See Table 3.)

The channelling of Palestinian workers by the Israeli government is accomplished both negatively and positively -- negatively by refusing work permits to Palestinians from the occupied territories for any job appropriate for unemployed Israelis, and positively through a crash program of vocational training in the occupied territories, an "indirect booster to the labor situation," according to the Israeli Economist.²⁴

Since August, 1968, 19 vocational training centers have been operated by the Israeli government in the West Bank.²⁵ There is a heavy emphasis on construction skills; in 1969/70 700 of the 1,260 who completed courses had been taught construction.²⁶ Construction trainees are given an allowance of IL 2.50 per study day, rather than the IL 1.75 paid to other students in the centers.²⁷ (In addition to this wage

Table 2

EMPLOYEES BY SOURCE AND FIELD OF EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAEL

	Total Employed	Employed in Building	Employed in Agriculture	Employed in Industry
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
From Judea and Samaria	1.1	6.9	2.2	0.5
From Gaza Strip and North Sinai	0.3	2.2	0.6	0.2
Total from (occupied) Areas	<u>1.4</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>0.7</u>
Non-Jews in Israel	9.1	20.7	21.5	7.2
Non-Jews -- total	10.5	29.8	24.3	7.9
Jews	89.5	70.2	75.7	92.1

Source: Unit for Coordination of Activity in the Administered Areas, Israel Ministry of Defense, Development and Economic Situation in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and North Sinai: 1967-1969, A Summary.

trainees receive a monthly food allotment distributed by CARE through a "food-for-work" program.)²⁸

The construction course lasts only three months, though courses in other skills cover a year. In the summer of 1971 an Arab teacher in an UNWRA vocational training center in Gaza said that similar Israeli-sponsored programs there taught participants "only how to tell the difference between a hammer and a saw. When they finish the course, they are at most semi-skilled -- certainly you could not say they are skilled workers. They are just taught enough to work under an Israeli foreman."²⁹ The low level of skills taught in the Israeli vocational training program is consonant with the allegations on the West Bank that the Israelis are interested in employing Arabs from the occupied areas only in menial capacities, and that in fact Israel encourages skilled workers from the West Bank to emigrate.³⁰

One aspect of the Israeli thrust to recruit workers on the West Bank is the attempt to employ women, who traditionally have been consigned to unpaid labor on family farms (though of course this pattern began to change long before the Israeli occupation in 1967.) "In the towns (of the West Bank), it would seem, the supply of employed men is nearly exhausted, and any expansion of the labor force will only be possible by recruiting women and by natural increase of the working-age population," an Israeli Ministry of Defense document observes.³¹ Seven of the Israeli-operated vocational training centers on the West Bank are for teaching girls and women to sew -- essentially preparing them for employment in Israeli clothing enterprises. In 1969/70 180 women completed such courses.³²

There is every indication that Israel plans to exploit the West Bank work force to an increasing extent. A RAND study, funded by the Ford Foundation and carried out by four Israeli professors concluded, "It is assumed that if the Israeli economy will continue to develop at the existing growth rate, it will be able to absorb an additional 30,000 workers from the territories in 1973, and an additional 20,000 workers until 1978; thus creating 75,000 jobs for the territories in 1978."³³

Agriculture

In the months after the war, the Israeli authorities decided on an "open bridges" policy, whereby the West Bank is allowed to sell its agricultural and industrial surplus on the East Bank.³⁴ (The bridges, of course, are "open" in one direction only, and freedom of import from the East Bank is not permitted.) In the long run, the "open bridges" policy preserves the economic conduits between the West Bank and adjacent Arab areas -- an important potential consideration if Israeli dreams of access to the markets of the surrounding countries are to be realized.

More immediately, this policy solved the Israelis' problem of how to dispose of West Bank agricultural surpluses. On the one hand, if they were left unsold, the economy of the West Bank would have collapsed completely, causing a drain on the Israeli economy and a possible intensification in the resistance of the people of the occupied areas. On the other hand, if fruits and vegetables grown on the West Bank had reached Israeli markets at that point, they would have undersold Israeli produce by 20 to 25 percent.³⁵ Initially the Israelis inhibited the sale of West Bank produce in Israeli markets by regulations requiring special permits, health checks on processed foods, and certification that the import would not result in Israeli surpluses.³⁶

In 1968/69, the Israeli occupation authorities, in consultation with West Bank notables and "agricultural leaders," drew up a new plan for West Bank agriculture.³⁷ Basically, this plan was aimed at reducing the dependence of West Bank farmers on Arab markets, and reorienting their production to meet Israeli demands, by supplying some consumer items which Israel had heretofore to import, and by supplying other items to Israeli industry.³⁸

A salient example of the Israeli occupation authorities' efforts to decrease the dependence of West Bank farmers on Arab markets is their discouraging farmers from growing melons and other high water-content fruit, an important summer export item to the arid Arab countries.³⁹ Between 1968 and 1969, the melon crop of the West Bank fell from 36,000 tons to 20,500 tons.⁴⁰

Table 3

DATA ON WORKERS EMPLOYED THROUGH ISRAELI EMPLOYMENT OFFICES FOR JUDEA AND SAMARIA IN SELECTED MONTHS

<u>Month</u>	Total Who Sought Work	Employed in Region	Employed in Israel	Not Found Jobs
Dec. 68	11,747	2,671	3,381	4,692
March 69	12,034	3,435	5,506	3,093
June 69	8,821	1,805	5,097	1,919
Sept. 69	11,505	1,753	7,568	2,184
Dec. 69	16,784	1,153	13,026	2,554
March 70	22,008	1,624	17,961	2,423

Source: Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories, Three Years of Military Government, June, 1970, p. 15.

Israel is achieving its agricultural plans for the West Bank by encouraging the planting of approved new crops by a variety of methods: "demonstration projects," which provide seeds of approved crops to the farmer, plus costs above those of his previous crops, "agricultural committees" composed of "notables and leading farmers," and through the activities of the "Marketing Officer" attached to the occupation staff.⁴¹ For example, the 1969/70 agricultural plan states, "It is also recommended that farmers producing tomatoes and eggplants for export should in the months of March-April send their surpluses to the Israel markets. During that period there is a demand for these products on the Israel market. Such a program will serve as an incentive to Arab growers to sign export contracts."⁴² The report also notes, "With the help of the Ministry of Agriculture, contracts were now signed between the growers and Israel canning factories. Thus the farmers will increase the areas of such crops which Israel had to import previously."⁴³

The production on the West Bank of industrial crops needed by Israeli factories is increasing: between 1968 and 1969, for instance, the production of sesame shot up from 700 to 1700 tons, and cotton, tobacco, sugar beet and other industrial and labor intensive crops are also being encouraged.⁴⁴

Israeli propaganda has stressed the "great advantages" of Israeli technology to the "backward agriculture" of the West Bank (where as a matter of fact, crop production levels were comparable to those of Israeli Arab agriculture.)⁴⁵ There can be no doubt that "great advantages" have accrued to the burgeoning Israeli chemical industry in the development of West Bank agriculture: the Israeli occupation authorities note that Israeli agriculture uses 20 times as much fertilizer per dunam of cultivated land as do the farmers of the West Bank, and have stressed the value of chemical insecticides and fertilizers in "demonstration days" for Arab farmers.⁴⁶ Now chemicals are the second most important agricultural supply (after fodder) imported from Israel.⁴⁷

Industry

In the area of industry, too, Israel has plans for the West Bank. West Bank industry is on quite a small scale, and the flooding of its markets with Israeli manufactured products -- 75 percent of Israeli exports to the West Bank are manufactured goods -- certainly will not encourage its independent development.⁴⁸ One of the effects of Israeli economic policy on the West Bank is, in fact, to inhibit significant industrialization. The RAND study previously referred to concludes that, like

the Arabs in Israel, the West Bank would be "unable to make any significant progress in industrial development."⁴⁹

Nevertheless, Israel is beginning to exert control over existing industry on the West Bank. In August, 1969 the Israeli government announced subsidies for Israeli and foreign investors in the occupied areas, including tax relief, sureties of security and possible lower prices on raw materials. (In case of joint ventures, the resident partner would not be eligible for the subsidies.)⁵⁰ But because the political future is still in doubt, Israelis have been unwilling to invest there, though Israeli factories are already appearing in Gaza, which the Israeli government says it plans to keep under Israeli rule.

Instead of direct investment, Israeli firms are sub-contracting work out to West Bank firms, in order to take advantage of the cheap labor. By 1969, just two years after the occupation began, 9 percent of the West Bank's industrial workers were already employed in filling Israeli orders.⁵¹ (See Table 4.) "Sewing shops are sprouting," the Jerusalem Post reported, "to do jobs for Ata, Rex, Barbir, Elastex and others. 'We have another eight clothing factories ready to give orders if there are takers,' Mr. Bechar (of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) said. Contracts are given out by furniture factories: Rahat of Lydda has booked orders with companies in Nablus and Bethlehem. An Israeli company was planning to build its own foam mattress plant, but instead placed orders with a fac-

tory in the West Bank to the sum of IL 400,000 in 1968, and will double the amount this year."⁵²

The Staff Officer for Commerce and Industry, an Israeli from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry attached to the military occupation staff, is generally responsible for coordinating the West Bank's industry with Israeli needs. One of his functions is to arrange contacts between Israeli manufacturers with used equipment for sale and West Bank industrialists who are prospective customers; now most of the "new" equipment coming into West Bank factories is refurbished used Israeli equipment. This officer's other duties include: "advising and giving practical guidance to factory and workshop owners on everything connected with the purchase of raw materials in Israel and abroad. . . providing technological advice on all aspects of industrial standards employed in Israel in the manufacture of various products. . . (encouraging) manufacturers in the (occupied) areas to participate in exhibitions and trade fairs in Israel and abroad, and (sending) samples of their products abroad for exhibition at such fairs."⁵³

Conclusion

Israel has imposed a nascent "subimperialism" on the West Bank, flooding its markets with Israeli goods, exploiting its working class as menial laborers in Israel, and utilizing its agriculture for certain produce for Israeli consumers and industry. Such a pattern means ultimately that the control of the

TABLE 4

SUBCONTRACTS FROM ISRAELI INDUSTRY (by district)

<u>District</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
Nablus	IL. 480,000	IL. 880,000
Ramallah	30,000	50,000
Bethlehem	300,000	430,000
Hebron	--	25,000
Total	IL. 810,000	1,385,000

economic life of the West Bank is in the hands of Israel, and unless this pattern is disrupted, any political "self-determination" will be meaningless.

The significance of Israeli economic policies during the occupation of the West Bank extends beyond the Jordan River. The Arab people of the Middle East are facing a grave danger of peace -- a peace agreement with the Israelis, concluded over their heads after the suppression of the Palestinian Resistance movement, and a general rightward trend in the Arab regimes. Peace means, the Israelis have said again and again, open economic frontiers. Such a peace would mean that variants of the pattern of economic colonialism imposed on the West Bank would almost inevitably be imposed on other areas of the Arab East.

notes

1. Kol Israel radio broadcast, Nov. 9, 1968
2. MERIP Reports # 3, November, 1971
3. Michael Bruno, Economic Development Problems of Israel 1970-1980, RAND, April, 1970 p. 59
4. Bruno, p. 35
5. Bruno, p. 51
6. Bruno, p. 54
7. Letter from Eli Mayslisch, Peter Tikvak, to Haaretz, May 15, 1969. Translated in ISRACA, #2 June-July 1969, p. 8
8. New York Times, June 3, 1969
9. This section of the article will deal specifically with the West Bank economy. The economies of the West Bank and Gaza are different, and the effects of the occupation are different, so they require separate treatment. East Jerusalem has already been "unified" with West Jerusalem (i.e., annexed to Israel) and Gaza too seems slated for some sort of political and economic integration with Israel. Because the Israeli policy for the West Bank seems to be economic integration without political absorption, it is particularly useful to study the West Bank economy to derive some indication of possible patterns of economic relationships between Israel and other parts of the Arab world if a peace settlement is imposed. Where a statistical breakdown between the West Bank and Gaza is not available, data for the occupied areas as a whole is employed.
10. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Bulletin. December, 1970 and Israel Economist, April, 1971
11. Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Areas, Israel Ministry of Defense, Three Years of Military Government, June, 1970. p. 4
12. I.C.B.S., Monthly Bulletin. Dec., 1970 and Israel Economist, April, 1971
13. I.C.B.S. and Israel Economist, Same as above.
14. Israel Economist. April, 1971
15. Unit for Coordination of Activity in the Administered Areas, Israel Ministry of Defense, Development and Economic Situation in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and North Sinai: 1967-69, A Summary. October, 1970. unpagued.
16. Development and Economic Situation
17. Israel Economist June, 1971. p. 208
18. Jerusalem Post, July 31, 1967
19. New Outlook, October 1968, p. 54
20. Development and Economic Situation....
21. Israel Economist, October, 1971 p. 319
22. Three Years of Military Government, p. 14
Five district offices were opened, one each in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm, and village offices were also established in the Hebron, Ramallah, Jenin and Tulkarm districts.
23. Same as above, p. 15
24. Israel Economist, October, 1971. p. 319

continued on p. 17.

(continued from page 11)

25. Three Years of Military Government, p. 17.
26. Same as above, p. 18.
27. Same as above
28. Same as above
29. Interview by author, June 26, 1971
30. Resistance in the Middle East, Fall 1971. p. 9
31. Development and Economic Situation... Three Years of Military Government, p. 17
33. Haim Ben Shahr, Eitan Berglas, Yair Mundlak and Ezra Sadan, Economic Structure and Development Prospects of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, RAND Corporation, September 1971. p. 126. The authors note in their introduction that "...there is one assumption of a political nature on which this analysis is based: that there will be economic relations of one sort or another between the (occupied) territories and Israel." p. 1
34. About a third of the West Bank's agricultural produce is sold on the East Bank.
35. Ann Mosely Lesch, Israel's Occupation of the West Bank: The First Two Years, M.A. Thesis, Dept. of Political Science, Columbia University, 1969, p. 34
36. Jerusalem Post, October 22, 1967
37. Aryeh Sheskin, "Post-war Economics of the West Bank," October, 1969, p. 21 New Outlook
38. Israel Ministry of Agriculture, Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip: Agricultural Development Plans for 1969/70.
39. Same as above, p. 2
40. Three Years of Military Government, p. 27
41. Same as above, p. 22,24
42. Agricultural Development Plans, p. 3
43. Same as above, p. 2
44. Three Years of Military Government, pp. 24, 27
45. Lesch, p. 35
46. Israel Ministry of Defense, The Israel Administration in Judea, Samaria and Gaza: A Record of Progress. p. 41
47. Three Years of Military Government, p. 28
48. Development and Economic Situation...
49. Ben Shahr, et. al., p. 104
50. Haaretz, August 11, 1968. Translated in ISRACA, May 1969
51. Three Years of Military Government, p. 32
52. Jerusalem Post Overseas Weekly, February 17, 1969. p. 7
53. Three Years of Military Government, p. 33

Subscribe to
MERIP Reports
\$6